Re: [44net] Suggestions on ROA and route records for AMPRnet space

On 20 Nov 2021, at 20:56, Keaton VE5LPL via 44Net &lt;44net(a)mailman.ampr.org&gt; wrote: I think there are a few things that could be done in terms of BGP subnets. Adding a property to Allocations and Assignments in the AMPRnet Portal that adds a column to the table when browsing with the authorized ASN. The fixing of whois.ampr.org The addition of origin: properties, similar to regular RPSL (RFC2622) route records to the aforementioned whois server using the ASN property. Additionally in future with that property in the portal creating an ROA for the subnet automatically. With that/those ASN(s) being added to the origin property in the whois as mentioned. Making BGP routing of 44net more secure cause of the ROAs. Note: for those not familiar with RPKI ROAs, it's a system of cryptography that allow verifiable authorization of BGP announcements. Since none of the data ever sent is encrypted, but simply signed with all the public keys, no data is not readable. It would to my knowledge at least comply with Canadian amateur regulations in regards to cryptography for over the air amateur transmissions. Further using that same data to automatically generate route records in ARIN. The addition of an ASN property to the portal with automatic ARIN route records and ROAs could make significant strides in helping ensure announcements are consistent with ARDC's goals. Whilst it won't fix abuse and commercial usage of AMPRnet. It will help in the enforcement of policies and eliminate hijacking of AMPRnet space, where I have several times reported such hijacks as I've come across them. As more and more networks and internet backbones reject routes that have invalid ROAs with more doing so over the years makes prefixes routable across the internet effectively impossible with an ROA that mismatches. In terms of the automation of this, I am not aware of how the backend of the portal functions but no doubt it wouldn't require a massive overhaul to implement the automatic ROA and route record functions I've mentioned. ARIN provides a method for organizations to use an API to submit ROAs and route records automatically. I have used the API myself and am working on an automated system for some of my other networks. I would suggest that once the system has been put into place, that all allocatees that hold a /24 or more receive an email stating they must submit the authorized ASN(s) by $date via the portal. And at such time an AS0 (or UCSD's AS7377) ROA for 44.0.0.0/9 and 44.128.0.0/10 will be issued making their announcement invalid without submitting an ASN and thus an ROA issued having their address space un-announceable via BGP. I have mainly kept silent on this mailing list however I think that the addition of these changes are the best way to go all things considered. I thought this would be relevant considering the talk about abuse and how to control unauthorized announcements. And these changes would make revoking BGP announcements on unresponsive parties possible, easy and efficient for ARDC. Please be easy on me, I'm not that comfortable talking on mailing lists. Just some suggestions that could help. Thought this was going to be a shorter email. woops. Sincerely, Keaton VE5LPL A Saskatchewian ham who does stuff and things https://kagl.me me(a)kagl.me On 11/20/21 12:01 PM, Steve L via 44Net wrote: > I know many of the BGP subnets are not listed on the portal's network list. > I'm not sure if there is a reason for this or if it's some sort of > technical oversight. And on that note, perhaps if they can/should be > included, perhaps they can be noted as BPG? > On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 9:32 AM Chris Smith via 44Net > &lt;44net(a)mailman.ampr.org&gt; wrote: >> >>> On 20 Nov 2021, at 15:05, Ruben ON3RVH via 44Net &lt;44net(a)mailman.ampr.org&gt; wrote: >>> >>> It is true that the 44.144 reverse zone is almost empty, however it - currently - is only updated at end user's request. >>> There - currently - is no filtering on valid PTR records for internet access at our border, however we are designing a new connectivity system for our users and can incorporate that. >>> >>> Whether or not everyone should do that is up for debate imo and if the majority should decide that and UCSD follows and makes it a rule of thumb then indeed everyone should do that. Maybe discussion to be held with the TAC? >> >> I don't personally think it matters whether all allocated addresses have reverse PTR records, so long as: >> >> 1) Anyone suspecting a violation of our terms of service reports it to abuse(a)ardc.net <mailto:abuse@ardc.net> then it can be investigated and dealt with accordingly, and >> >> 2) Every individual responsible for using an IP address from ARDC is registered with us, so we know who to contact. >> >> It is 2) that we have the problem with: >> >> When a group or organisation (or in some cases individuals) registers a block of addresses then sub-allocates those addresses, often there is poor, or in some cases no audit trail to an individual user. I’ve had to deal with issues, for example, with folk setting up VPN servers then letting anyone use it without any vetting procedure or logs being kept. >> >> This is a problem! >> >> There is a new API being developed that will allow user registration and authentication, I would like to invite all parties that currently (or plan to) sub-allocate ARDC space to contact me so we can discuss integration of the API with their systems. We need a verifiable audit trail for users of our address space, this has to end with the Responsible Person for any allocated IP address. >> >> 73, >> Chris - G1FEF >> >> >> >> _________________________________________ >> 44Net mailing list >> 44Net(a)mailman.ampr.org >> https://mailman.ampr.org/mailman/listinfo/44net > _________________________________________ > 44Net mailing list > 44Net(a)mailman.ampr.org > https://mailman.ampr.org/mailman/listinfo/44net _________________________________________ 44Net mailing list 44Net(a)mailman.ampr.org https://mailman.ampr.org/mailman/listinfo/44net