On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 8:44 AM, Jann Traschewski <jann(a)gmx.de> wrote:
However I could track down the source based on the
44net allocation.
E.g.
dmr.db0myk.ampr.org resolves to 44.225.73.37 and the responsible
person for "db0myk" is Hans, DL5DI, according to our database from the
regulator. This is still no authentication but a very close assumption
that arriving IP packets from 44.225.73.37 are from Hans.
Unfortunately, the law here doesn't work like that:
(b) For stations participating in a message forwarding system, the
control operator of the station originating a message is primarily
accountable for any violation of the rules in this part contained in
the message.
It says nothing about the control operator of the first internet
gateway; accountability is on the originating station. If Hans is
operating a gateway on local RF, we need to know the identity of the
local ham on RF, not the gateway operator. There are various ways to
accomplish this, many of which have been discussed on the list. For
example, emails can be authenticated with a PGP digital signature. The
equivalent layer 3 technology is IPsec(AH).
Tom KD7LXL