Marius,
Not delusional at all, in my security instance, if I were to have
IPENCAP closed, I wouldn't configure my device to send ICMP Unreachable
messages for it. The perceived gain is that my router doesn't use CPU
resources to process a packet I don't want. This is a common
configuration of a Firewall that Drops by default - I'm not "forcing" my
firewall to do it. It takes additional configuration to
accept-then-reject. The drop by default is helpful in scenarios like a
DDoS attack at the border attempting to use you for an amplification attack.
- For example, If I don't have SSH open, I won't send ICMP Port
Unreachable if a scanner or hacker attempts to connect. Besides, a
scanner is probably ignoring them and looking for SYN-ACKs only.
- For something like PMTU Discovery, I simply allow ICMP - Fragmentation
Needed messages.
- On AMPR, the operators have made a troubleshooting case for a need to
Ping me, so I permit ICMP Echo Request from your GW IPs and 44 allocations.
- Traceroute causes CPU resources to be used on my router or other
downstream devices, even for a destination IP other than itself, so I
block TTLs >= 7.
- In any case, unsolicited packets on my WAN are not considered
"legitimate" to me, so DROPping is OK.
- In all cases, outbound is allowed, so the reverse path is OK.
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~peterb/network/drop-vs-reject
When reading this link, recall:
- I have 0 "legitimate users" on the WAN
- The only knowledge I'm giving to an attacker whom I drop is my IP,
which they already possess
- I WANT port scans to fail, even from the LAN (the writer makes an
opposite assumption)
73,
- Lynwood
KB3VWG
for some delusional security advantages.