Grettings to the group, this Rasomware theme is an evolving project, some
employe just opened an infected email and it was an attack vector on the
internal platform that runs around the LAN via the port 445 SMB protocol
using a security hole that already Microsoft solved two months ago.
Precisely the attackers know that many companies do not update the OS of
their internal pc for issues of licensing and budget that make them
vulnerable, also do not pay much attention to the safety of their
equipment, here was shown how fragile it is the windows platform for these
attacks and is the bulk of the equipment that these large companies have,
such as the case of Telefonica in Spain, FEDEX, hospital networks in
England, etc.
These themes are every day in BBVA Corporation in my IT Security
(Cybersecurity) Venezuela work, see this problem in a important evolution
but it is more to come because they will continue looking for new
possibilities to be able to collect the money with the Bitcoins.
On the question of the domains, those that are in the common Internet those
are not relevant, only the important are the .onion underground that they
use to recolet the extortion money from people-companies through these
crypto tools attacks.
As Brian says, linux and mac are safe for now...
73 de Gabriel YV5KXE
Venezuela AMPR-Coordinator
Message: 2
Date: Sat, 13 May 2017 04:51:33 +0000
From: R P <ronenp(a)hotmail.com>
To: AMPRNet working group <44net(a)hamradio.ucsd.edu>
Subject: Re: [44net] the current worldwide Windows ransomware
situation
Message-ID:
<BY2PR14MB04246C791B6C331478C3B033C7E30@BY2PR14MB0424.
namprd14.prod.outlook.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
IM not sure that this is the right group but as i wrote before here we
have top experts in it field so Ill try
I read the explain on the virus in the sites ...
The domain is well known .. someone pay for it
is it so problem to catch the person who paid for this domain ???
what about shutting out this domain and by that stop the spread of the
software ?
> Yes, I can see your example. Fortunately, one thing I have seen so far
> is routers being supplied with all inbound connections stopped.
> Furthermore, mine doesn't allow you to totally disable the firewall,
> only for specific hosts (which I have done for some key Linux systems),
> or for specific ports on specific hosts (which I did on Windows for
> testing - I never leave Windows exposed to the net). Now with a router
> like mine, your scenario wouldn't work, because the temporary IP
> addresses would never be allowed to pass.
> So, there are ways to build it into the router design to make it harder
> for people to shoot themselves in the foot. :)
Yes, I think there has been some ISP/Manufacturer working group to get this
cleared up and defined. My ISP waited with IPv6 rollout until this was
resolved, and the router they deliver does exactly what you describe above.
When IPv6 was designed, the idea was still that every host should be able
to communicate with every other host. That has proven to be a bad idea
on an open network, so IPv6 had to be crippled to make it viable. But that
at the same time removes one of the major incentives to roll it out, as NAT
can be used as an alternative solution in most situations. Many places
have still not started IPv6 rollout...
Rob
If you're interested in reading more about the current Windows
worm/ransomware, these two sites have brief articles explaining what's up.
http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/05/wannacry.htmlhttps://securelist.com/blog/incidents/78351/wannacry-ransomware-used-in-wid…
Note that they recommend blocking ports 139 and 445 to help prevent the
spread of the worm infection. Amprgw has been blocking those ports for
quite some time, but that doesn't prevent the infection from spreading
within a group of computers or an organization. It is strongly suggested
that people running Windows should be sure that all issued patches have
been applied.
As usual, systems running non-Windows OS's (Linux, etc) are immune to
this attack.
- Brian
I know that very few of you are looking at the amprgw router statistics,
but for those who do care: the current statistics (packet/byte counts)
accumulate since router boot time. Would it be more helpful/meaningful
if the totals reset at midnight so that they reflect daily trends?
Also, some of the numbers are getting large enough that they're not
intuitively meaningful. There's no convenient way to insert thousands
separators. Would 'scientific notation' (eg, 1.56e9) be helpful? (This
is the 'g' format specifier in 'C'.) Or alternatively, notation such
as 1.5k, 2.4M, 8.1G, or 1.2T could possibly be generated.
- Brian
> Patches are often applied late because it's not rare to experience serious disruption.
> Anyway the software being patched is poorly made in the first place.
> The problems caused by patches are actually another sign of very poor software design.
And not the least: after 25 years of development on Windows the patching mechanism still
is in a sad state, requiring unreasonable time and resources to find and install required patches.
It is very clear that quality isn't a priority for Microsoft *at all*. They only care about
making money, what happens to their customers and how much time they waste on using and maintaining
their products does not matter to them as long as they keep buying.
Rob
> To help prevent this from affecting AMPRNet systems, I am now blocking
> inbound port 16992 at the amprgw gateway. I hope this won't cause you
> any difficulties.
Thanks for the hint. It is surprisingly difficult to get technical information
from the Intel documents. Do you block TCP only or also UDP? And what about
ports 16993 and 16994? (and maybe even 623 and 664?)
The nice thing about such new vulnerabilities is that they allow you to identify
the aforementioned scanners and put them on the permanent blacklist.
Aside from shodan.io (that were already on the blocklist) I also see
52.174.52.33 census01.project-magellan.com
Yet another annoying "research" project...
You could try to get 44.0.0.0/8 opted out via research(a)project-magellan.com
Rob
In the past there have been complaints of some RIP44 packets not
reaching their destination, enough so that routes sometimes
vanish from the RIP44 table on the receiver. Although there is
currently little I can do about packet loss on the network,
I have slowed down the rip sender by 100 microseconds per sent
packet to avoid saturating buffers on busy networking equipment
and thereby avoid causing possible congestion loss. This means
that it now takes a little over a second to send the complete set
of (currently) 26 RIP44 packets to each of (currently) 435 gateways.
I don't know if this was the cause nor whether this will help,
but it's a cheap fix and it may help. Slightly slower packet
delivery shouldn't negatively affect anyone.
RIP44 transmissions are still sent every five minutes.
- Brian
On May 1st, Intel released a security advisory regarding their Active
Management Technology. It's a nasty one, but luckily it doesn't seem
to affect home (non-datacenter) PC firmware.
> https://security-center.intel.com/advisory.aspx?intelid=INTEL-SA-00075&lang…
Intel has released a mitigation guide:
> https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/26754
Security researchers have since been able to uncover more details and
release proof-of-concept exploit code. There is now a free nmap .nse
plugin available to scan for this vulnerability:
> https://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/http-vuln-cve2017-5689.html
To help prevent this from affecting AMPRNet systems, I am now blocking
inbound port 16992 at the amprgw gateway. I hope this won't cause you
any difficulties.
- Brian
> I've been curious how many of the 435 registered gateways were reachable,
> so I collected ICMP unreachable messages during a recent RIP transmission
> (which of course sends to every gateway) and got the following:
> 33 gateways aren't reachable or are rejecting inbound IPIP packets
I think it would be a good idea to somehow keep track of this information and remove
or at least mark inactive those gateways for which this condition persists
for some amount of time. Especially when protocol 4 is rejected.
Host unreachable could be because the internet is down or the power is out,
but an explicit protocol 4 rejected indicates nonexistent configuration, that
could temporarily exist because e.g. new system has just been installed that has
not been configured yet, but should not persist for longer than say 2 weeks.
The operator can alwayes re-enable or re-add the gateway when he has found the
opportunity to re-install it.
Rob