I hope that I'm not breaking thread continuity, but I've subscribed requesting daily batches and don't know how to change it.

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As it is UDP based and relies on source of UDP packets, which is easy to spoof, current routing infrastructure is vulnerable to unrestricted injecting of 44/8 routes to it's gateways - anybody can send forged RIP updates to them.

Here I don't think the situation is that critical. The RIP updates are sent via tunnel, and should be accepted only from the ampr-gw tunnel interface. The attacker needs actually to block out original IPIP traffic and spoof the IPIP tunnel to get fake RIP data into the network. This is a little harder than just sending a bunch of UDP packets to a

host.

It's just as hard as decapsulating these packages in ampr-ripd. There's no need to disturb communication, as IPIP tunnel is not being established - it's just another IP header one can easily spoof, there's no authenticity control.

This kind of DoS attack on AMPRnet won't be very interesting, but may be quite annoying to gateway operators. On the other side, it may result in sending unsolicited IPIP traffic to random hosts. Firewalling (by restricting pool of destination hosts for protocol 4) would do the job of limiting such activity, but on the other hand would be one step back, as list of gateways would need maintenance by hand.

I really don't see the point of doing that. Crackers want benefits from their work: e-mail collecting, snmp access, spamming, not the glory of sending data to a compromised system to which they are the only ones having access. And creating a DOS attack like this on an APMPR host is nothing interesting.

So I do. Can't find any other use than a bit creepy SMURF-like DDoS.

So this is a non-issue unless there are unassigned subnets floating around in the portal for people to grab.

There's a lot of such subnets. I just got banned for routing one of them through 192.168.0.1.